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1 Introduction
This paper aims to shed light on how labour market unionisation a¤ects the
competitive selection e¤ects of international trade and wage dispersion in the
presence of rm heterogeneity and inter-country asymmetries. Specically, we
extend the monopolistic competition model developed by Melitz and Ottaviano
[27] to allow for rm-specic unions.
In recent years, new good quality rm-level data has drawn attention to the
existence of substantial intra-industry heterogeneity in performance across rms
and to the role of competitive selection in determining the export performance of
countries. For instance, a recent Bruegel and CEPR report [24] documents how
the international performance of European countries is driven by a relatively
small number of rms which are more productive and larger than others, but
that also pay higher wages.
Consistent with this evidence, an emerging body of empirical literature nds
that the link between international trade and wage dispersion works through the
wage di¤erentials between exporters and non-exporters,1 suggesting that rm
heterogeneity and competitive selection processes may be a key channel through
which trade liberalisation contributes to the increasing wage inequality observed
across countries particularly in light of the fact that a large proportion of this
inequality occurs in most countries within-groups and not only between groups
of workers with di¤erent observable characteristics (such as skills and educa-
tion).2 The e¤ects of international trade on the equilibrium size-distribution
and export status of rms, however, also appear to be inuenced by other fac-
tors such as changes in the market power of rms (e.g. Wälde and Weiß, [38]),
or labour market liberalisation (e.g. Cos¸ar et al, [8]).
A key stylised fact that motivates our analysis in this paper is that, across
the OECD as a whole, increases in wage dispersion have been paralleled by
a widespread tendency towards a reduction in the degree of centralisation of
collective wage bargaining. As highlighted in a number of OECD reports ([31],
[32], [33]), even in countries with traditionally centralised industrial relation sys-
tems such as Germany and Italy, the importance of industry level negotiations
has diminished and the prominence of rm-level and plant-level agreements has
increased since at least the mid 1990s.3 This trend is particularly marked in
the manufacturing sector, which has traditionally been more centralised than
others. As argued by Dri¢ ll [11], the decentralisation of wage setting reects
1See for instance Menezes-Filho et al [28] and Schank et al [35] and references therein.
2See among others: Autor et al [4], McCall [25], Barth and Lucifora [5], Goos and Manning
[16] and Dustmann et al [12].
3 In Germany, plant-level agreements have proliferated since the early 1990s via the enact-
ment of opening clauses that authorise companies to opt-out of national negotiations (Jürgens,
[21]). In Italy, a progressive decentralisation of bargaining to the company level that began in
the early 1990s culminated in the recent (January 2011) agreement at the FIAT Miraori plant
which is widely recognised as paving the way to a widespread move towards sub-rm level
agreements outside industry wide frameworks. In the UK, the tendency towards bargaining
decentralisation has been noted since the early 1980s. Company or plant level bargaining is
characteristic of Canada, Japan, Korea, the United States, New Zealand, and in Mexico (see
e.g. Tuman, [36]).
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a reduction of union power resulting from the combined e¤ects of a shrinking
share of employment in manufacturing and an increasing competitive pressure
due to international economic integration. Indeed, the adoption of highly de-
centralised bargaining practices has typically been motivated by the argument
that in the interest of international competitiveness wage settlements ought to
reect variations in productivity and protability across both rms and prot-
centres (or divisions) within individual rms which industry level agreements
fail to recognize.
To capture these stylized facts, we develop a framework in which the com-
petitive pressure (and hence markup) is both rm-specic and market-specic,
and wages are set via a bargaining process between unions and rms which can
occur at the rm or at the sub-rm (i.e. at the prot-centre) level. We then
examine how the interplay between unionization and international trade a¤ects
industry performance and selection within environments characterized by dif-
ferent degrees of integration between countries as well as by other inter-country
asymmetries.
Recent theoretical developments have provided micro-foundations for the
existence of inter-rm di¤erences in productivity and a considerable body of
literature has focussed on their e¤ects on export performance.4 In comparison,
relatively little attention has been devoted to the interaction between rms
selection and labour markets and most papers that do so do not focus on the role
of unions as a source of labour market imperfections. Within an e¢ ciency wage
model, Davis and Harrigan [9] nd that wages di¤er between rms as a result
of their di¤erent monitoring technologies. A fair-wage e¤ort mechanism where
wages depend on productivities is used by Egger and Kreickemeier [14] who
nd that more integration increases wage inequality.5 Helpman and Itskhoki
[18] study the e¤ects of hiring and ring rigidities on trade and unemployment
and nd that, unless a non-linear hiring function is assumed, wages are the same
across rms. Wage dispersion emerges instead in Helpman et al [19], but as a
result of heterogeneity of workers in some unobservable ability. Felbermayr,
Prat and Schmerer [15], in a model with search frictions with individual or
collective e¢ cient wage bargaining, nd that rms with di¤erent productivities
pay similar wages regardless of the bargaining environment. Unionization is
considered, within a di¤erent context from ours that focuses on multinational
production, by Eckel and Egger [13] who nd wages to be the same for all rms,
with a wage premium paid by exporters. Furthermore, with the exception of
Helpman and Itskhoki [18] and Helpman et al [19] who allow for inter-country
asymmetries in the degree of labour market frictions, all the above mentioned
works di¤er from our model in that they assume fully symmetric countries.
4Montagna [29] studies the e¤ects of trade liberalization on rmsselection in the presence
of inter-country di¤erences in rmsproductivity distributions. Melitz [26] introduces a xed
export cost in the presence of uncertainty about post-entry e¢ ciency and shows how only
more productive rms self-select into an export status. For recent reviews of the literature,
see Helpman [17] and Redding [34].
5Amiti and Davis [2] adopt a similar framework and test its predictions using highly detailed
Indonesian manufacturing census data.
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A conclusion that can be drawn from these contributions is that the emer-
gence of inter-rm wage dispersion, whereby more e¢ cient rms pay higher
wages, crucially rests on the existence of a rent-sharing mechanism between
workers and rms. Our choice to focus on unionisation, rather than on other
forms of labour market imperfection, is motivated by the key role that unions
continue to play, despite a decline in union membership, in most industrial
economies (see, e.g., Visser [37]).
The results of our paper enrich the literature in this area. With endoge-
nous markups, bargaining between heterogeneous rms and rm-specic unions
implies that wages will di¤er between rms with more e¢ cient rms paying
higher wages. This is consistent with the results obtained by Egger and Kreick-
emeier [14] and others. However, in our model, the rent extracted by a union
does not only depend on the productivity of the rm but also on its market
power which is rm specic. In particular, a rms price elasticity of demand
decreases in its productivity. Therefore, more e¢ cient rms enjoy a stronger
monopoly position in the industry and o¤er a higher potential for rent extraction
to their union. Due to market segmentation, however, the monopoly power of
rms is also market specic with an exporting rm thus having two indepen-
dent prot-centres associated with its domestic and export sales respectively.
In this context, we show how a decentralisation of bargaining at the sub-rm
(i.e. prot-centre) level alters rent-sharing incentives and outcomes and results
in wage discrimination across the di¤erent activities of the rm, as unions mod-
erate their export wage requests in order to aid their rms access to foreign
markets. A key implications of our analysis, therefore, is that  as the wage
setting process shifts to the sub-rm level trade liberalisation can a¤ect wage
inequality even among identical workers within an industry along two dimen-
sions: across rms (via its e¤ects on competitive selection) and within rms
(via wage discrimination across destination markets).6 As argued by Egger and
Kreickemeier [14], to the extent that rm-heterogeneity in productivity leads to
wage dispersion within industries, workers are not indi¤erent as to which rm
they are employed by. Our analysis further suggests that  as sub-rm level
negotiations gain in importance worldwide workers may also increasingly not
be indi¤erent as to which operation of an e¢ cient rm they will work in.
Since, for a given bargaining power, a unions rent extraction ability is higher
the higher is the productivity of the rm, an increase in union power in one coun-
try will translate in relatively larger wage demand increases in relatively more
e¢ cient rms i.e. stronger unions will hurt (via higher wages) more e¢ cient
rms relatively more than less e¢ cient ones. This will generate a counter-
competitive e¤ect, amounting to a reduction in the average productivity of the
industry, and will also act as a competition-softening device for domestic rms
and as a competition-toughening device for exporting rms (by increasing the
minimum level of productivity required to export, as stronger unions moderate
wage demands less). Via its e¤ects on competition and selection, an increase in
6Wälde and Weiß[38] obtain within-rm wage inequality as a result of unobservable indi-
vidual characteristics.
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union power may also have a pro-variety e¤ect that, by increasing the number
of rms in the economy, will raise welfare despite the lower average productivity
in the industry. We show how, in this framework, a trade liberalisation that
facilitates access to a foreign market by reducing the minimum level of pro-
ductivity required to export and thus softening the need for wage moderation
to protect rms international competitiveness will reduce within-rm wage
dispersion. The opposite will happen if trade liberalisation implies that the
domestic market becomes more accessible to foreign rms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a closed
economy version of the model and derives its long run equilibrium properties.
Section 3 extends the framework to a two-country world. Section 4 concludes
the paper and draws out some of the key testable hypotheses that emerge from
the analysis.
2 Autarky
We consider an economy populated by L identical households supplying labour
services to a competitive industry, that produces a homogeneous good, and
to a monopolistically competitive industry, that produces a horizontally dif-
ferentiated good. Firms in the monopolistic sector are heterogeneous in their
productivity and discover their level of technical e¢ ciency only after having
made a costly and irreversible investment prior to entry into the industry. As
is standard in the monopolistic competition literature, we assume there to be a
continuum of potential rms in this sector, each su¢ ciently small so as to ignore
the impact of its actions on the behaviour of its competitors. Thus, while enjoy-
ing by virtue of product di¤erentiation some monopoly power, rms do not
strategically interact with each other. In terms of preferences and technologies,
the model is based on the framework developed by Melitz and Ottaviano [27].
The key di¤erence with their model is that workers in the monopolistic sector
are organized in rm-specic unions which bargain with rms over the wage.
2.1 Preferences
Consumer preferences, dened over a continuum of varieties (indexed by i 2 
)
of a horizontally di¤erentiated good and a homogeneous good, are described by
the following quadratic quasi-linear utility function:
U(q0 ; q
(i); i 2 
) = q0+
Z
i2

q(i)di  1
2

Z
i2

q(i)2di  1
2

0@Z
i2

q(i)di
1A2 , (1)
where q(i) is a typical household  0s consumption of variety i of the di¤er-
entiated good and q0 is its consumption of the homogeneous good; ,  and
 are positive preference parameters. Specically:  captures the degree of
consumersbias towards product di¤erentiation (i.e. towards a dispersed con-
sumption of varieties); both  and  capture the intensity of preferences for the
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di¤erentiated good with respect to the homogeneous good (which increases in
 and decreases in ); a higher  also reects a higher degree of substitutability
between varieties.
It will prove convenient to use the homogenous good as the numeraire and
set its price at unity, i.e. p0 = 1. Then, denoting with ~
  
 the subset of
varieties that are consumed, the budget constraint of a typical household will
be given by: Z
i2~

p(i)q(i)di+ q0 = I + q0, (2)
where p(i) is the price of variety i, I is the households income, and q0 is its
initial endowment of the numeraire; to ensure positive consumption of the nu-
meraire, we assume income to be su¢ ciently large, with: I >
Z
i2~

p(i)q(i)di.
We shall further assume that each household supplies one unit of labour in-
elastically that can be hired by both a rm in the monopolistic sector and by
producers in the competitive sector.7 Denoting, with w and w0 the wage rate in
the monopolistic sector and in the competitive sector respectively, the expected
income of household  employed by rm i will then be given by:
I = w(i)l(i) + w0l

0,
where l(i) and l0 = 1 l(i) are the amount of work performed by the household
in the monopolistic sector and in the competitive sector, respectively.8 It is
obvious that when w(i) > w0 a worker strictly prefers to work for a rm in the
monopolistic sector, and the condition to have at least some employment in this
sector requires that w(i)  w0.
Maximisation of (1) subject to (2) yields the inverse individual demand for
each variety produced by the monopolistic sector:
p(i) =   q(i)  Q , (3)
where Q =
Z
i2~

q(i)di is total individual consumption of the di¤erentiated
good. Inverting (3) and aggregating over consumers yields the demand function
facing each rm i:
q(i) = L


( + N)
  1

p(i) +

 ( + N)
N p

(4)
7 It is of course possible to envisage di¤erent employment congurations (e.g. with em-
ployment in only one of the sectors, or in more than one monopolistic rm). For simplicity,
we rule out these cases by assumption as they would not substantially alter the qualitative
nature of the results.
8As we shall see, no aggregate prots persist in equilibrium. Hence, income only depends
on labour income.
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where q(i) = Lq(i), and N is the measure of consumed varieties in ~
 with
average price p = 1N
Z
i2~

p(i)di. The price threshold for the demand for a variety
to be positive is:
pmax  ( + N p)
 + N
. (5)
Thus, pmax can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the toughness of
competition in the industry. As is clear from (5), pmax is positively related to p
and (given that, from (3), p(i) < ) it is negatively related to N : i.e. the lower
their average price and the larger the number of varieties, the more competitive
is the industry and the lower is the price a variety needs to have for its demand
to be positive.
As is evident from (4), demand is independent of income; this is a key draw-
back of the quasi-linear utility function since it rules out general equilibrium
income e¤ects. However, in contrast to the Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity of
substitution framework more commonly used in this literature, the price elastic-
ity of demand here is not constant and does not solely depend on the degree of
product di¤erentiation. From (4) and (5), for a given price p(i), the price elas-
ticity of demand of rm i is given by: q(i) =
 @q(i)@p(i) p(i)q(i)  = [(pmax=p(i))  1] 1
which falls in pmax (i.e. it increases in the number of varieties N and falls in the
average price p). Thus, the tougher is competition in the industry the higher
will be the price elasticity of demand for a given variety. Clearly, for a given
pmax, the price elasticity of demand for a variety will be higher the higher is its
price p(i).
2.2 Production
Both sectors use labour as the only factor of production. In the competitive
sector, one unit of the homogeneous good is produced with one unit of labour.
Prior to entry into the monopolistic sector, ex-ante identical rms need to
incur a xed cost fE related to the set up of plants and production lines and
to the research and development (R&D) activity required for the introduction
of a new variety of the good. This cost, which is identical for all entrants, is in
terms of the homogeneous good and is sunk after entry. Subsequent production
occurs according to a constant returns to scale technology:
q(c) =
l(c)
c
. (6)
where l is the rms labour demand and c is its unit labour requirement. Given
the uncertainty characterising the outcome of R&D e¤orts, it is only after mak-
ing the irreversible investment fE that a rm will learn how productive its
technology is; we assume that c is drawn from some cumulative distribution,
G(c). Hence, there will emerge a distribution of entrants across marginal costs
with rms exhibiting, after entry, heterogeneous productivities. Since rms
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with the same cost parameter c are symmetric, henceforth we shall index rms
by c alone. Thus, a typical rm will have marginal production cost w(c)c, where
w(c) is the wage paid to its workers, and operating prots:
(c) = [p(c)  w(c)c] q(c). (7)
Due to the assumption of a continuum of rms in the industry, a rm takes
the number of competitors and the industry average price as given. Hence, the
price and the quantity which solve the rms maximisation problem must satisfy
the following relationship:
q(c) =
L

[p(c)  w(c)c] . (8)
Given the demand equation in (4), (8) then yields the optimal price set by the
rm:
p(c) =
w(c)c
2
+
 + N p
2 ( + N)
. (9)
Substituting (8) into (7), we obtain maximized operating prots:
(c) =
L

[p(c)  w(c)c]2 . (10)
It will prove useful, by substituting equation (8) into equation (6), to derive
the quantity of labour demanded by a rm with cost parameter c:
l(c) =
Lc

[p(c)  w(c)c] , (11)
which can then be used to rewrite the maximised prots in (10) in terms of
labour demand:
(c) =

Lc2
l2(c). (12)
Given that the entry cost is sunk, only rms capable of covering their marginal
cost i.e. with p(c)  w(c)c will be able to survive in the market. Clearly, for
active rms, it must be the case that p(c)  pmax which, given (9), requires that
w(c)c  pmax. Thus, the lower is pmax (and the tougher is competition in the
industry), the lower will be the marginal cost that allows rms to break-even.
2.3 Unions
In the numeraire homogenous good sector, the labour market is perfectly com-
petitive and all employers pay the same wage w0. Since the price of the good
and the value of the marginal product of labour in this sector are both xed at
unity, w0 is also equal to 1. Labour in the monopolistic sector is unionized. We
adopt the right-to-manage model in which employment is determined unilater-
ally by the rm and the wage is determined via a bargaining process between
rms and rm-specic unions.
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The Nash bargaining solution to the rm specic right-to-manage model is
obtained by:
max
w(c)
 = v log [V (w(c); l(c))] + (1  v) log [ (w(c); l(c))  0(c)] , (13)
where 0 < v  1 represents the bargaining power of the union, 0(c) is the
rms reservation prot and V is the unions total labour rent. The case in
which v = 1 corresponds to the monopoly union model; instead, when v = 0,
the model collapses into the no-union case considered in Melitz and Ottaviano
[27]. Without loss of generality, we shall set 0(c) at zero.9 Union is total
labour rent above the competitive wage paid to non-unionized workers is given
by:
V (w(c); l(c)) = l(c)[w(c)  1]. (14)
Given (12) and (14), maximization of the Nash bargaining product in (13)
subject to the labour demand equation in (11) and the equilibrium price in (9)
yields the following wage equation:
w(c) = 1 +
2v
(v + 2) c
[p(c)  c] . (15)
Note that, for expressions (8) and (10) to be positive, it must be the case that
p(c)  w(c)c. Given (15), this condition holds if and only if:
p(c)  c. (16)
Condition (16), in turn, implies that w(c)  w0 = 1. As is clear from (15),
bargaining at the level of the rm then results in a distribution of rm specic
wages, above the reservation wage, that depend on the cost parameter of rms.
The level of employment in the monopolistic sector is determined by demand;
the remaining labour supply is absorbed by the competitive sector which will
clear the labour market.10
2.4 The long-run autarkic equilibrium
Prior to entry into the industry, a rms expected prot is
R cD
0
(c)dG(c)  fE
which needs to be non-negative for entry to occur. In the absence of entry
restrictions, rms will continue to enter the industry until expected prots are
driven to zero. Thus, the free-entry zero-protequilibrium requires:Z cD
0
(c)dG(c) = fE .
9This is equivalent to assuming that a rm would have to stop production in case of a
break-down of negotiations.
10Unionisation could be introduced in the homogenous sector as well. However, this sector
serves as an anchorin the model and xes the reservation wage to the level that clears the
labour market. Introducing unions in this sector would result in aggregate unemployment
and require another mechanism to x the reservation wage  the most plausible one being
an unemployment benet which, in turn, would require taxation and a government budget
constraint. Although interesting, this case goes beyond the aims of this paper.
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After having paid the xed cost fE , a rm will stay in the market and start
producing only if it draws a su¢ ciently low unit labour requirement parameter
c or will exit immediately otherwise. The entry condition above identies a
threshold, or cut-o¤, level of unit labour requirement cD at which a rm will
just break-even and which is dened by the following equivalent zero-prot
condition:
cD  sup fc : (cD) = 0g : (17)
Substituting (15) into (10), and the resulting expression into (17) yields:
(cD) = 0() p(cD) = cDw(cD), (18)
where p(cD) and w(cD) are the price and wage of marginal rms with unit
labour requirement cD. Thus, cD denotes the upper limit of the range of c
of rms actually producing in the industry. Entrants whose draw is such that
c  cD will remain in the market and start producing: of these, the non-marginal
rms (i.e. those with c < cD) will earn gross (of the entry cost) positive prots.
Entrants with a value of c > cD will exit the market and forego the entry cost.
Substituting the price from equation (18) into the wage equation in (15)
yields:
w(cD) = 1. (19)
i.e. the wage paid by the marginal rms equals the competitive wage. Noting
that operating prots for the marginal rms are equal to zero, which implies
p(cD) = cD, and substituting the wages in (15) and (19) into (9) and (8), the
optimal prices and output levels of a typical rm can now be written as functions
of cD:
p(c) =
(v + 2) cD + (2  v) c
4
and q(c) =
(2  v)L
4
(cD   c) . (20)
Similarly, maximized prot levels can be written as:
(c) =
L (2  v)2
16
(cD   c)2 . (21)
Thus, for a given v, rms with lower unit labour requirements will set lower
prices, sell larger quantities, and have larger prots than less productive rms.
These rms will also charge higher absolute markups11  dened as (c) =
p(c)  w(c)c and expressed in terms of cD as:
(c) =
1
4
(2  v) (cD   c) , (22)
despite the fact that they will also pay higher wages, as seen by substituting
p(c) from (20) into (15):
w(c) = 1 +
v
2
cD
c
  1

. (23)
11For v = 0, these results correspond to those in Melitz and Ottaviano [27].
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The intuition for the negative relationship between the optimal negotiated wage
and the cost parameter c is that a more productive rm o¤ers its union a higher
potential to capture some of the rents it earns in the product market. The
primary source of these rents, in turn, is the rms monopoly position in the
industry. As shown, in this model, the price elasticity of demand is rm specic:
for a given toughness of the competitive environment characterising the industry,
it increases in the price of the rm and, given (20), in its cost parameter c (i.e.:
@q(c)
@c > 0). Thus, rms with higher costs, and facing a higher price elasticity of
demand, o¤er their unions a lower rent extraction opportunity. Furthermore, a
higher cost rm presents its union with a higher wage elasticity of labour demand
i.e. @w(c)@c > 0, where w(c) =
 @l(c)@w(c) w(c)l(c) : given the trade-o¤ between wage
and employment, this implies that the incentive for unions to bid for higher
wages falls as the cost parameter of the rm increases. Thus, the lower is the
productivity of a rm, the lower will be its degree of monopoly power in the
product market and the higher will be the wage elasticity of labour demand
facing its union; as a result, the lower will be the rent that a union will extract
from the rm and the extent to which the negotiated wage will depart from the
competitive wage.12 Hence, unionisation weakens the relative cost advantage of
high productivity rms, and we can state that:
Proposition 1 Unionisation mitigates the e¤ects of inter-rm heterogeneity in
productivity on the cost distribution of rms.
This result and the dependence of the wage on the productivity of the rm 
which will in turn a¤ect all other endogenous variables in the model represents
a rst important departure from the Melitz and Ottaviano [27] model in which
the marginal cost of the rm was ultimately solely dependent on its productivity
parameter.
As is now common in the literature, we adopt a Pareto distribution as the
specic parameterization of G(c).13 This distribution has a higher unit labour
requirement bound cM and shape parameter   1:
G(c) =

c
cM

; c 2 [0; cM ]. (24)
This parameterization implies that high productivity rms are less frequent than
low productivity ones, with the shape parameter  indexing the dispersion of
the unit labour requirement draws. When  = 1, the unit labour requirement
distribution is uniform on [0; cM ]. As  increases, the distribution is more con-
centrated at higher values of c. As  goes to innity, the distribution becomes
12Essentially, the negative e¤ect of an increase in wage on a rms unit labour costs and
thus on employment is higher in a high cost rm. Even accounting for the fact that the level of
employment per unit of output is higher the lower the productivity of the rm, this translates
into a higher wage elasticity of labour demand in high cost rms  and hence in a higher
incentive for unions to contain wage demands.
13Del Gatto et al [10] show that the Pareto distribution o¤ers a good approximation of the
productivity distribution of rms in 11 European Countries.
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degenerate at cM . Given (24), the average unit labour requirement of entrants
is given by c = cM=( + 1), with variance equal to c=[( + 2)]. Thus, the
higher is cM , the higher will be the mean and the variance of the unit labour
requirement draws.
Making use of this parameterisation, we can now determine the market struc-
ture of the industry. Substituting (24) into (21) and imposing the zero-prot
free-entry condition yields the following closed form solution for the cut-o¤ level
of c:14
cD =
"
8 (+ 1) (+ 2) fEc

M
L (2  v)2
#1=(+2)
. (25)
Substituting (25) into equations (20)-(24) we can obtain the average levels of
the unit labour requirements, prices, mark-ups, outputs, prots, and wages,
respectively given as:
c =

+ 1
cD, p =
(4+ v + 2)
4 (+ 1)
cD,  =
1
4
(2  v) cD
(+ 1)
(26)
q =
(2  v)L
4 (k + 1)
cD,  =
L (v   2)2 c2D
8 (+ 1) (+ 2)
, w = 1 +
v
2 (  1) .
Noting that for the marginal rms it must be the case that pD = pmax = cD,
substitution of p from (26) into (5) allows to determine the number of rms
selling in the economy as:
N =
4 (+ 1) 
 (2  v)
  cD
cD
. (27)
Given (27), the number of entrants can then be obtained from:
NE = N=G(cD). (28)
The following proposition summarises the e¤ects of union power on the long-
run equilibrium of the model.
Proposition 2 An increase in the bargaining power of unions v will have: (i) a
selection-softening e¤ect, reducing the toughness of competition in the industry
via an increase in the value of cD; (ii) a counter-competitive e¤ect, by in-
creasing average prices, and reducing average markups and prots; (iii) a wage
inequality e¤ect by increasing wage dispersion; and (iv) a pro-variety e¤ect, by
increasing the mass of rms selling in the economy when the preference for the
di¤erentiated good is su¢ ciently strong.
Inspection of (25) shows that @cD@v > 0, i.e. a higher bargaining power of
unions reduces the minimum level of productivity required to survive in equilib-
rium. This essentially amounts to a reduction in the toughness of competition
14A su¢ cient condition for cD < cM to hold is that
q
[8 (+ 1) (+ 2) fE ]=[L (2  v)2] <
cM , which we impose.
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and a softening of the competitive selection process within the industry thus
leading to more entry of relatively less e¢ cient rms. Underpinning this result
is the e¤ect that the bargaining power of unions has on rm-specic wages. As
discussed, for a given v, a union will be able to negotiate a higher wage the
higher is the productivity of its rm. In addition, however, the responsiveness
of wages to changes in union power is also higher in relatively more productive
rms: from equation (23), it can be veried that the elasticity of the wage with
respect to changes in v falls in c (i.e. @2w;v(c)@c < 0, where: 2w;v (c) = @w(c)@v vw(c) ).
Thus, for a given cut-o¤, an increase in v will translate in relatively higher wage
demand increases in relatively more productive rms  i.e. it will hurt (via a
higher wage) more e¢ cient rms relatively more than less e¢ cient ones and
thus result in a redistribution of market shares towards less e¢ cient producers.
Inspection of (26) reveals that this change in the e¢ ciency composition of the
industry, in turn, is accompanied by a counter-competitive e¤ect reected in a
lower average level of productivity (i.e. a higher c), higher average prices (p),
lower average quantities (q), and a reduction in both the average markup () and
prot (). The increase in the cut-o¤ resulting from an increase in v will also
lead to an increase in the dispersion of wages, as can be seen using the average
wage w in (26) to obtain the variance of wages: 2w =
v2
4( 1)2( 2) , which in-
creases in v: Despite these e¤ects, however, an increase in the bargaining power
of unions may results in a larger mass of rms producing in the industry if the
preference for the di¤erentiated good (as reected by ) is su¢ ciently strong:
as is clear from equation (27), @N@v > 0 if  > (+ 2) cD=.
15
Finally, note that as can be seen from (25) and (23) an increase in the
size of the economy reduces the cut-o¤ level cD and, consequently, the wage set
by each rm.
2.5 Welfare
Before extending the model to an open economy setting, it is interesting to
examine the e¤ects of unionisation on the level of welfare.
Since free entry implies that aggregate prots vanish in equilibrium, we
measure welfare by consumersindirect utility. The indirect utility function of
a typical consumer  is given by:
W  I + q0 +B. (29)
The term B in (29) is common to all consumers and is dened as:
B  1
2

 +

N
 1
(  p)2 + 1
2
N

2p, (30)
where 2p is the variance of prices, given by:
2p =
(2  v)2
16

(+ 2) (+ 1)
2 (cD)
2 . (31)
15For N to be positive,  needs to be greater than cD .
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Given (30), comparative statics on (29) reveals that welfare decreases in
p and increases in both N and 2p. The increase in welfare resulting from a
higher N reects the standard love of variety e¤ect. For a given p, increases
in 2p have a positive e¤ect on welfare (as in Melitz and Ottaviano [27]) since
they induce consumers to re-optimise and reallocate expenditure towards both
cheaper varieties and the numeraire good. For a given value of the cut-o¤ cD,
p is increasing in v, and 2p is decreasing in v. Substituting p from (26) and 
2
p
from (31) in (30), B can be rewritten as:
B =
1
4
(  cD)

2  cD (2+ v + 2)
(+ 2)

, (32)
where the condition that  > cD implies that B > 0.
The average indirect utility in the economy is given by:
W 
P
W
L
= I + q0 +B,
where the average households income, I, is:
I  V C N + wc(L 
lN)
L
=
(V C   l)N
L
+ 1.
In the above, V C is the average variable cost of production sustained by a rm
(i.e. the average labour income generated by a rm) and l is the average labour
demand of rms in the monopolistic sector. These are respectively given by:
V C =
L (2  v) (+ v)
4 (+ 1) (+ 2)
(cD)
2 ,
and
l =
L (2  v)
4 (+ 1) (+ 2)
(cD)
2 .
It then follows that @ I@v R 0 if, and only if,  R cD [2v + 4 +  (2  v)] =[ (2  v)+
4], i.e. the average households income increases in v only if the preference for
the di¤erentiated good is su¢ ciently strong. As discussed earlier, when  is suf-
ciently large, the mass of rms in the industry increases in v. In this instance,
total employment in the monopolistic sector can also be shown to increase in v
and so will the proportion of workers in the economy that perceive the higher
monopolistic wage.16 Also, from (32) we obtain:
@B
@v =   14 @cD@v
h
2  cD(2+v+2)(+2) + ( cD)(2+v+2)(+2)
i
  14 ( cD)cD+2 < 0 (33)
Note that, as can be easily veried from (26) and (31), @p@v > 0 and
@2p
@v < 0.
Thus, the negative e¤ects of v on B via a higher average price and a lower
variance of prices more than o¤set its positive e¤ect via an increase in the mass
of varieties N . Thus:
16The condion for @N
l
@v
> 0 to hold is  > 2cD .
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Proposition 3 An increase in the bargaining power of unions increases welfare
if the preference for the di¤erentiated good is su¢ ciently strong.
When preferences for the di¤erentiated good are su¢ ciently weak (i.e. for
small values of ), an increase in the bargaining power of unions will unambigu-
ously lower welfare, since it reduces both B and I. As discussed, a rise in v has a
selection-softening and a counter-competitive e¤ect that result in lower average
productivity in the industry and hence in higher average prices as well as in
a lower variance of prices. If consumers love of variety is su¢ ciently low, an
increase in union power will also have a counter-variety e¤ect that reduces the
mass of varieties produced in the industry. In this instance, stronger unions will
unambiguously lower welfare. However, when preferences for the di¤erentiated
good are su¢ ciently strong, this result can be reversed, as the pro-variety e¤ect
of an increase in v more than o¤sets the adverse counter-competitive e¤ects on
the average price and on the variance of prices. Thus, when the value placed by
consumers on product di¤erentiation is high, more powerful unions will increase
welfare, despite the worsening of the average productivity of rms, by reducing
the toughness of competition in the industry and allowing for a larger mass of
rms to survive in equilibrium an e¤ect that will also result in higher average
household incomes.17
Unionisation, therefore, inuences the operation of the standard forces (such
as number of rms and prices) that a¤ect welfare in this type of models. Ulti-
mately, via its e¤ects on rm selection, union power does not have unambigu-
ously negative e¤ects on welfare  as implied by the standard distortionary
view of unionisation.
3 Two-Country World
In this section we extend the analysis to consider two-countries, home and for-
eign, and examine how international di¤erences in union bargaining power a¤ect
inter-market linkages and relative performance. We use an asterisk to refer to
foreign variables and the subscripts D and X to denote variables associated with
domestic and export sales, respectively. Whenever appropriate and for ease of
exposition, the model will be discussed in terms of the home countrys variables
only.
The two economies, endowed respectively with a mass of households L and
L, are assumed to be symmetric both in consumer preferences and in the pro-
duction technologies of the two sectors. We shall, however, allow for asymme-
tries to exist in population size, trade barriers and bargaining power of unions.
The homogeneous good is assumed to be freely traded. Thus, continuing to
use this good as the numeraire implies that the wage in this sector is equal to
one in both countries. In the monopolistically competitive sector, markets are
segmented; we shall further assume that trade occurs at a cost with rms in
17The fact that welfare in this model depends on both market size and mass of producers
is a key di¤erence with the results obtained by Egger and Kreickemeier [14].
15
the home (foreign) country incurring a per-unit trade cost  > 1 ( > 1) when
selling their output to consumers located abroad. Therefore, a unit of the good
produced in the home country with cost w(c)c will be delivered to consumers
abroad at a cost w(c)c.
In each country, rms entering the monopolistic sector draw their unit labour
requirement coe¢ cients c simultaneously from an identical Pareto distribution
G(c) after having paid the xed entry cost fE . A rm will then decide whether to
produce or not, or whether to export or not, depending on the prots it expects
to earn at home and abroad, conditional on the productivity distribution of the
entrants that will eventually decide to produce.
Due to market segmentation, the toughness of competition in rmsdomestic
and export markets is di¤erent i.e. the price threshold for positive demand is
market-specic, with:
pmax  ( + N p)
 + N
and pmax 
( + Np)
 + N
: (34)
Given that production occurs according to a constant returns to scale tech-
nology, a rm deciding to export will have two separate prot centres  one
linked to production for the domestic market and one linked to its export ac-
tivity and will maximise the prots it earns from domestic and export sales,
given respectively by D(c) and X(c), independently. The resulting prices and
markups are prot-centre (or market) specic and so are the price elasticities of
demand facing the rm. Following the same procedure as in the closed economy,
the rms labour demands to produce for the domestic market, lD(c), and that
to produce for the export market, lX(c), can then be found to be:
lD(c) =
Lc

[pD(c)  w(c)c] and lX(c) = L
c

[pX(c)  w(c)c] . (35)
which can be used to write the maximized prots as:
D(c) =
 [lD(c)]
2
Lc2
and X(c) =
 [lX(c)]
2
Lc2
. (36)
Thus, rms with cost parameter c produce for the domestic market if, and only
if, D(c)  0, and export to the foreign market if, and only if, X(c)  0.
3.1 Unions
In the monopolistic sector workers are unionised. As noted, due to market
segmentation, exporting rms in this sector face di¤erent competitive pressures
and hence face di¤erent elasticities of demand and enjoy di¤erent monopoly
positions in their domestic and export markets. Thus, not only will the rent
extraction ability of unions vary between rms but also between the di¤erent
activities (or prot centres) of a rm.
In recent years, the need to recognize not only rm-specic but also plant
(or prot-centre) specic conditions within the same rm has motivated the
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drive across the OECD (even in countries traditionally characterised by high
levels of collective bargaining coverage) towards a reduction in the degree of
centralisation of wage bargaining, down from the industry level to the level of
the rm and, further, to the level of individual plants within a rm result-
ing in a rm signing a number of di¤erent contracts with unions (Kamakura,
[22]). Above-average numbers of agreements per rm are to be found in the
chemical, electricity, energy, metalworking, telecommunications and electronics
industries with their number typically increasing in the size of the establish-
ment; for example, in the chemical industry in Finland 90% of rms have on
average 13 contracts per establishment (Kamakura, [22]). Local bargaining is
particularly dominant in the export sector, as the perceived need to attune pay
settlements to the competitive position of the di¤erent activities of the rm is
higher (Jackson, [20]). Essentially, rm and plant level agreements are seen
as a means to ensure that wage settlements (or other negotiated issues) reect
variations in productivity and protability across both rms and prot-centres
within individual rms.18
Against this background, it is therefore relevant to envisage two scenarios:
(i) a prot-centre level bargaining, in which each rm-union pair undertakes
two separate bargaining processes: one to determine the wage paid to workers
employed to produce for the domestic market and the other to set the wage for
the workers employed to produce for exports; and (ii) a rm level bargaining,
in which the rm and the union negotiate a unique wage for all the labour
employed by the rm.
The Nash bargaining problem for rms producing only for the domestic
market is given by (13) which is solved subject to the prot D(c) in (36) and
the unions total labour rent in (14) to yield:
wD(c) = 1 +
2v
(v + 2)c
[pD(c)  c] , (37)
that has the same functional form as the autarkic wage.
For exporting rms, the wage determination process will di¤er depending on
whether they bargain with their union at the prot-centre or at the rm level.
With a prot-centre level bargaining, w(c) = (wD(c); wX(c)) where wD(c) and
wX(c) are a typical rm-union pairs domestic and export wage, respectively.
wD(c) is determined by solving the same bargaining problem of a non-exporting
rm and will be given by (37). The wage paid to the workers employed in
producing for the export market will instead be set by solving:
max
wX(c)
X = v log [lX(c) (wX(c)  1)] + (1  v) log
"
 [lX(c)]
2
Lc2
#
,
18 In a study for the CBI, Brown [7] documents the increasing practice in the UK of de-
centralising internal bargaining at the sub-rm level. Leopold and Jackson [23] discusses the
case of the British company Coats Viyella PLC which opted out of national industry negoti-
ations in 1989 and decentralised bargaining to 16 prot centres that could cover multiple
or individual plants, but also be limited to specic production lines within individual plants 
dened on the basis of the customer base and market pressures facing the di¤erent activities.
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subject to the labour demand in (35), to obtain:
wX(c) = 1 + 2
v
(v + 2) c

pX(c)

  c

. (38)
Following the same reasoning as for the closed economy, it is easy to verify that
pX(c)  c; (38) then implies that wX(c)  1.
In the rm-level bargaining regime, an exporting rm with cost parameter
c will negotiate a unique wage wU (c) with its union covering both its domestic
and export prot-centres. In this instance, w(c) = wU (c) which is obtained by
solving:
max
wU (c)
U = v log [(lD(c) + lX(c)) (wU (c)  1)] +
(1  v) log [D (wU (c); l(c)) + X (wU (c); lX(c))] ,
subject to the labour demands and prots given in (35) and (36), to yield the
rst-order condition:
@U
@wU (c)
=   vc
2
 
L+ L2

2 (lD(c) + lX(c))
+
v
(w(c)  1)  
(1  v) (lD(c) +  lX(c))

c2
 
1
L lD(c)
2 + 1L lX(c)
2
 = 0
(39)
which is highly non-linear and does not allow to obtain an analytical solution
for the wage in the general case of 0 < v < 1. For v = 1, i.e. for the limiting
case of monopoly unions, (39) can be solved to obtain:
wU (c) =
1
3
+
2
3c
LpD(c) + L
pX(c)
L+ L2
. (40)
For given productivity cut-o¤s, this optimal wage rule can be written as a convex
combination of the two wages obtained via the prot-centre level wage bargain-
ing:
wU (c) = wD(c) + (1  )wX(c) (41)
where  = LL+L2 can be obtained by substituting the expressions for wU (c),
wD(c), and wX(c) into (41).  gives a measure of the trade-cost-adjusted rel-
ative size of the domestic market: the larger is the relative size of the domestic
economy and/or the higher is the accessibility of the foreign market (i.e. the
larger is L and the smaller is ), the closer will be the unique wage to the do-
mestic wage set under prot-centre level bargaining. Figure 1 plots wU together
with wD and wX numerically for the general case of 0 < v < 1 and shows
the unique rm-level wage to lie between the two prot-centre specic wages;
specically, we nd that: wX(c) < wU (c) < wD(c).
Insert Figure1 about here
In the interest of conciseness and analytical tractability, and given our aim
to examine the e¤ects of variations in the bargaining power of unions in and be-
tween countries, in the remainder of the paper the primary focus of our analysis
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will be on the prot-centre level bargaining regime. The equilibrium wages and
productivity cut-o¤s for the rm-level bargaining case with monopoly unions
are derived in the Appendix and we shall compare results between the two
bargaining regimes whenever relevant.
3.2 The long-run two-country equilibrium
As in autarky, free entry and exit into the industry implies that expected prots
are driven to zero in equilibrium. The possibility of exporting, however, will
result in the emergence of two cut-o¤s for c that dene, respectively, the upper
limit of the range of c over which rms produce only for the local market, and
the upper limit of the range of c over which rms export. Denoting these two
cut-o¤ points as cD and cX respectively, for a given number of entrants, NE , a
mass ND = G(cD)NE of rms will sell only in the domestic market and a mass
NX = G(cX)NE of rms will export. Given that rms would be forced to leave
if their prots were negative, the cut-o¤ levels for rms that sell in the domestic
market only and for rms that export are dened respectively by:
cD  sup fc : D(cD) = 0g ,
cX  sup fc : X(cX) = 0g ,
which describe the (zero-prot) indi¤erence conditions of marginal rms and
imply that rms that are just able to cover their marginal costs for domestic
and export sales are, respectively, characterized by:
D(cD) = 0() pD(cD) = wD(cD)cD, (42)
X(cX) = 0() pX(cX) = wX(cX)cX ,
where pD(cD) and wD(cD) are the price and the wage of the domestic market
rms with c = cD, and pX(cX) and wX(cX) are the export price and wage of
exporting rms with c = cX .19 Substituting the relevant price from (42) into
(37) and (38), yields:
wD(cD) = 1 and wX(cX) = 1, (43)
i.e., the wage paid by both types of marginal rms equals the competitive
wage.20 It then follows that (42) can be rewritten as:
pD(cD) = cD and pX(cX) = cX . (44)
As we shall show, cD > cX ; then, from (42), three types of entrants can
be identied: (i) low productivity rms, with c > cD, that will not be able to
produce and hence will exit; (ii) rms with intermediate productivity levels,
with cX < c  cD, that produce only for the local market; and (iii) high
19Note that (42) also holds for the case of rm level bargaining, in which wD = wX = wU .
20For the case of v = 1 and with symmetric countries, it can be veried from equation (66)
in the Appendix that wU (cX)  wU (cD) = 1.
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productivity rms, with c  cX , that produce for both the domestic and the
export market. Making use of (44) and the wages in (37) and (38), the optimal
prices and output levels for domestic and export sales can be written as functions
of the cut-o¤s:
pD(c) =
(v + 2) cD + (2  v) c
4
;
pX(c) =
 [(v + 2) cX + (2  v) c]
4
;
qD(c) =
(2  v)L
4
(cD   c) ;
qX(c) =
 (2  v)L
4
(cX   c) ;
(45)
with maximized prot levels respectively given by:
D(c) =
L (2  v)2
16
(cD   c)2 ;
X(c) =
2L (2  v)2
16
(cX   c)2 :
(46)
Similarly, the absolute markups obtained from domestic and export sales by a
rm with cost parameter c can be written as:
D(c) =
1
4
(2  v) (cD   c) and X(c) =

4
(2  v) (cX   c) ;
substituting prices from (45) into (37) and (38), the wage equations can be
written as:
wD(c) = 1 +
v
2
cD
c
  1

and wX(c) = 1 +
v
2
cX
c
  1

. (47)
Thus, for given values of v and  , rms with lower unit labour requirements
set lower prices, sell larger quantities, have higher prots and charge higher
(absolute) markups than less e¢ cient rms in both their domestic and export
markets despite the fact that they pay higher wages. As in the closed economy,
rms with lower values of c enjoy a lower price elasticity of demand and a better
monopoly position in their market (be it domestic or foreign). This gives their
unions a higher potential for rent extraction and, due to a lower wage elasticity
of labour demand, a higher incentive to set higher wages. As we show in the
Appendix (for the monopoly union case), more productive rms would pay
higher wages even under the rm-level bargaining regime (in which an exporting
rm pays the same wage to all its workers).
3.2.1 The e¢ ciency cut-o¤s and market structure
In a two-country setting, the two countriese¢ ciency cut-o¤ points need to be
determined jointly via the imposition of the zero expected prots free-entry and
exit conditions. For the home country, this is:Z cD
0
D(c)dG(c) +
Z cX
0
X(c)dG(c) = fE .
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which, using the parametrization in (24) and the optimized prots in (46), can
be rewritten as:
Lc+2D + 
2Lc(+2)X =
8cM (+ 1) (+ 2) fE
(2  v)2 .
Note that, from (42) and (43), a relationship can be derived between the
cut-o¤ facing domestic producers in one country and that facing exporters from
the other country, that is:
cX =
cD

, (48)
which depends on the accessibility of the home country from the foreign country
(determined by ). Making use of this relationship in the zero expected prot
conditions for both countries, we obtain the following system of equations:(
Lc
(+2)
D + 
 Lc(+2)D =
8cM (+1)(+2)fE
(2 v)2
Lc(+2)D + 
( )Lc(+2)D =
8cM (+1)(+2)fE
(2 v)2
,
which can be solved to derive cD and cD. Dening     2 (0; 1), which can
be interpreted as the degree of freenessof trade, we obtain:
cD =
8<:8c

M (+ 1) (+ 2) fE
h
(2  v)2   (2  v)2 
i
L (2  v)2 (2  v)2 (1  )
9=;
1
+2
, (49)
cD =
8<:8c

M (+ 1) (+ 2) fE
h
(2  v)2   (2  v)2 
i
L (2  v)2 (2  v)2 (1  )
9=;
1
+2
,
Making use of the relationship in (48) and the two countriesdomestic cut-
o¤s in (49), it is then straightforward to obtain the two countriesexport cut-o¤s:
cX = 
1

8<:8c

M (+ 1) (+ 2) fE
h
(2  v)2   (2  v)2 
i
L (2  v)2 (2  v)2 (1  )
9=;
1
+2
; (50)
cX = 
 1
8<:8c

M (+ 1) (+ 2) fE
h
(2  v)2   (2  v)2 
i
L (2  v)2 (2  v)2 (1  )
9=;
1
+2
From (49) and (50), the condition ensuring that both cD and cX are pos-
itive is: (2  v)2 > (2  v)2 , whilst cD and cX are positive if (2  v)2 >
(2  v)2 .
Comparison of (49) and (25) shows that, as in Melitz and Ottaviano [27],
when countries are symmetric, the domestic cut-o¤ under trade is lower than
that in autarky; by increasing product market competition, thus making it more
di¢ cult to survive in the domestic market and forcing less e¢ cient rms to exit,
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trade raises aggregate productivity. A better access to the foreign country (i.e.
a larger ) will, other things equal, reduce the domestic cut-o¤ and increase
the export cut-o¤, whilst an increase in the level of accessibility of the home
country by foreign exporters, i.e. a higher , will increase the domestic cut-
o¤ and reduce the export cut-o¤.21 An increase in the domestic and foreign
market size make it more di¢ cult to survive in the domestic and export market
respectively  i.e. a larger L and a larger L reduce cD and cX , respectively.
The intuition for this is that, with quasi-linear preferences, in a larger market
rms face a tougher competitive pressure and price on a more elastic segment
of their demand curve, thus charging lower mark-ups. As a result, a larger
destination market for their product (be it domestic or foreign) increases the
minimum e¢ ciency required for rms to break-even. These results are consistent
with those obtained by Melitz and Ottaviano [27] as can be seen by setting
v = v = 0 in (49) and (50)
As for the e¤ect of the bargaining power of unions on the cut-o¤s, given the
condition required to have a positive value of cD and cX , (49) and (50) yield:
@cD
@v
> 0,
@cX
@v
< 0
@cD
@v
< 0,
@cX
@v
> 0
Proposition 4 (1) An increase in the bargaining power of domestic unions
will have: (i) a selection-softening e¤ect for domestic rms, by reducing the
toughness of competition in the domestic market, and (ii) a selection-toughening
e¤ect for exporters, by increasing the toughness of competition in the foreign
market. (2) An increase in the bargaining power of foreign unions will have:
(i) a selection-toughening e¤ect for domestic rms, by increasing the toughness
of competition in the domestic market, and (ii) a selection-softening e¤ect for
exporters, by reducing the toughness of competition in the foreign market.
As we saw, for a given v, unions paired with more e¢ cient rms will be able
to negotiate higher wages than those in rms with higher unit labour require-
ments. Moreover, as in autarky, an increase in union power will translate in
relatively higher wage demand increases in relatively more e¢ cient rms (since
the elasticity of wages to changes in v falls in the cost parameter of the rm)
and hence will hurt exporters relatively more than domestic-only rms. As a
result, an increase in v softens competition in the domestic market and reduces
the minimum e¢ ciency required to break even in that market (i.e. cD increases).
Due to the higher wages, the minimum e¢ ciency required to be able to export,
however, increases if unions become more powerful: i.e. a higher v reduces
the export cut-o¤ cX and hence increases the average e¢ ciency of exporters.
This analysis further implies that: (i) rms exporting to a country whose unions
21As we show in the Appendix for the case of symmetric countries and monopoly unions,
rm-level wage setting would also result in an export cut-o¤ smaller than the domestic cut-
o¤. The e¤ects of trade liberalistation on the cut-o¤ are also qualitatively the same as in the
prot-centre level bargaining examined here, as shown in Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
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have become more powerful will face a softer competition from domestic rms
in that market; (ii) domestic rms in a market will face a tougher competition
from exporters based in a country whose union power has increased.
To determine the total mass of rms selling in the (home) market, rst note
that pD(cD) = cD = pmax. Substituting cD and cX from (49) and (50) into the
expression for pD(c) (and its equivalent for pX(c)) from (45), and making use of
(48), the average price of all the varieties (domestically produced and imported)
sold in the country can then be found to be:
p =

ND
ND +NX
(4+ v + 2) +
NX
ND +NX
(4+ v + 2)

cD
4 (+ 1)
. (51)
Substituting the number of domestic producers, ND = G(cD)NE =

cD
cM

NE ,
and the number of foreign producers exporting to the home market, NX =
G(cX)N

E =

cX
cM

NE , into (51) and making use of (48), we can rewrite p as
follows:
p =
[NE (4+ v + 2) + 
NE (4+ v
 + 2)] cD
4 (+ 1) (NE + NE)
. (52)
Combining (51), with the threshold price in (34) then yields the total number
of rms selling in the country:
N = ND +N

X =

cD
cM

(NE + 
NE) . (53)
Substituting (52) and (53) into cD = 1N+ (+ N p) (and doing the same
for the foreign country) yields a system of two equations that can be solved to
derive NE and NE . For the home country, the number of entrants is:
NE =
4 (+ 1) cM
 (2  v) (1  )
"
(  cD)
(cD)
+1   
(  cD)
(cD)
+1
#
. (54)
Substituting (54) into (53) then gives the total mass of rms operating in
the home country:
N =
4 (+ 1) (cD)

8><>:
( cD)
(cD)
+1 
( cD)
(cD)
+1
(2 v) +

"
( cD)
(cD)
+1 
( cD)
(cD)
+1
#
(2 v)
9>=>;
 (1  ) .
Finally, the mass of home producers selling in the domestic market and that of
domestic rms exporting to the foreign country are given respectively by:
ND = G(cD)NE =

cD
cM

NE and NX = G(cX)NE =

cX
cM

NE . (55)
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Recalling that cD = cX
, it is clear from (54) that for NE > 0 to hold,
cX < c

D must also hold (and cX < cD).
22 Hence, as in the non-union case
considered by Melitz and Ottaviano [27], the minimum e¢ ciency required to
export is higher than that required to operate in the domestic market alone.
Thus, only a subset of relatively more productive rms (with c  cX) will select
themselves into an exporting status. All other rms with cX < c  cD will
produce for the domestic market only.
The following proposition summarises the e¤ects of union power on the mar-
ket structure variables derived above.
Proposition 5 When the two countries are symmetric, an increase in the bar-
gaining power of unions in one country: (i) reduces the mass of rms entering
that country; (ii) reduces the mass of rms exporting from that country; (iii)
increases the mass of domestic rms selling in the country provided that the
preference for variety is su¢ ciently strong.
Imposing symmetry on (54), we nd that @NE@v < 0. It then follows that
@NX
@v < 0. Thus, an increase in union power in a country will always reduce the
mass of entrants into that country and the mass of exporters from that country.
Substituting (54) into (55), however, we nd:
ND =
4 (k + 1)
 (2  v) (1 + )
(  cD)
cD
from which it is clear that @ND@v > 0 provided that  >
(2+)
 cD. So, if the
preference for variety is su¢ ciently strong, more powerful unions result in a
larger mass of domestic rms surviving in the domestic market. Hence, despite
the fact that an increase in v reduces the mass of entrants into the industry,
the total mass of domestic rms serving the home market can increase. This
is due to the competition-softening e¤ect that stronger unions have on the do-
mestic market, making it easier for domestic rms to survive in the industry
by increasing cD.
To summarize: the opening up of trade does not alter qualitatively the e¤ects
of unionization on the productivity cut-o¤ for rms producing only for the
domestic market as in autarky, an increase in the bargaining power of unions
will result in more entry of less e¢ cient rms, thus lowering the average industry
productivity. However, an increase in unionspower will have an opposite e¤ect
on the cut-o¤ of exporting rms, raising the minimum e¢ ciency required to
export and hence the average e¢ ciency of exporters. Interestingly, the nature
of these results does not depend on the level of market integration. However,
at a maximum level of integration, under free-trade, the domestic and export
cut-o¤ points would coincide and hence the nature of the e¤ect of unions power
22The expressions for cD and cX in (49) and (50) imply that for cX < cD the following
condition needs to be satised L

L
> 1+
2

h
1 ~v2
~v2 
i
, where 2 v

2 v = ~v denes a measure of
the relative bargaing power of domestic unions.
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on the equilibrium distribution of rmsproductivity would correspond to that
obtained in the closed economy.
3.2.2 Wages, incomes and welfare
As is clear from (47), more productive rms pay higher wages in equilibrium in
both their domestic and export prot centres. However, given that cX < cD, it
is also the case that the domestic wage of an exporting rm with cost parameter
c is higher than its export wage: i.e. wD(c) > wX(c) always holds.
Proposition 6 Even though more productive rms pay higher wages than less
productive ones in both domestic and export prot centres, within an exporting
rm, the export-wageis lower than the domestic-wage.
Due to market segmentation, an exporting rm faces di¤erent competitive
pressures in its domestic and export market as is evident from (34). When
countries are symmetric, a rms price elasticity of demand is unambiguously
higher in its export than in its domestic market, i.e.: jDq(c)j < jXq(c)j. To see
this, note that under symmetry pmax = pmax and cD = c

D. Then, given that
cX =
cD
 , it is evident that pX(c) > pD(c) holds for any value of c; this implies:
jDq(c)j = [(pmax=pD(c))  1] 1 < jXq(c)j = [(pmax=pX(c))  1] 1. More gen-
erally, for the non-symmetric case, pX(c) > pD(c) and thus jDq(c)j < jXq(c)j
will hold if c > (v+2)(cD cX)( 1)(2 v) . Thus, rmsmonopoly power is lower in their
export market. Also, note that for the general case of asymmetric countries, the
wage elasticity of labour demand for export facing the union is higher than in the
domestic market: j2lX ;wj =

2
2 v
c
cX c +
v
2 v

> j2lD;wj =

2
2 v
c
cD c +
v
2 v

,
since cX < cD. Thus, by internalising the rms lower monopoly power in its
foreign market and the trade-o¤ that exists between wage and employment,
unions have an incentive to moderate their export wage demands in order to
aid their rms access to its foreign market.23 Prot-centre level negotiations
then result in wage-discrimination across the di¤erent activities of the rm.
The wages wD(c) and wX(c) are plotted in Figure 2 as a function of the labour
input requirement c. It is evident from the gure that whilst within an export-
ing rm wD(c) > wX(c), rms producing only for the domestic market, with
c 2 (cX ; cD], pay on average lower wages than exporters.24 However, the export
wage for the marginal exporters can be lower than the (domestic) wage paid by
the more e¢ cient non-exporting rms thus enabling a relatively low productiv-
ity exporter to compete internationally. This result is in line with that obtained
by Andersen and Sorensen [3] who, in a Ricardian trade model with hetero-
geneous rms, show that wages are lower in rms that marginally manage to
23This result is similar to that obtained in an oligopoly setting by Bastos and Kreickemeier
[6] who nd that, for su¢ ciently high levels of international economic integration, unions
moderate wage demands to aid the internationalisation of rms.
24These curves have been obtained for symmetric countries. The wages are plotted only
for values of c for which rms are active, i.e. c 2 [0; cX ] and c 2 [0; cD] for exporting and
non-exporting rms, respectively.
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export compared to rms marginally maintaining a position as nontradables.25
Insert Figure 2 about here
With rm-level bargaining, a rm pays the same wage to all its workers,
regardless of whether they are employed in the production for export or for
the domestic market. The cut-o¤ points and equilibrium wage under rm level
bargaining (for the monopoly union case, i.e. with v = 1, and for symmetric
countries) are derived in the Appendix. The wages obtained with this bargain-
ing regime are plotted together with those obtained under prot-centre level
negotiations over the distribution of c in Figure 3 below.
Insert Figure 3 about here
The curve for the rm-level (unique) wage paid by exporters terminates at
c = cX where the wage curve for domestic-only rms starts. As these two
curves illustrate, even with rm level wage setting, the wage of the more e¢ cient
domestic-only rms can exceed that of the least e¢ cient exporters. Moreover,
as expected, we nd that wX(c) < wU (c) < wD(c). By internalising the lower
monopoly power its rm has abroad, a union will have an incentive to set the
unique wage under rm-level bargaining, wU (c), below that it would set for the
rms domestic market operation under the prot-centre level regime. However,
a union will now have a lower incentive to moderate wage demands to aid
its rms international competitiveness  thus setting wU (c) above the wage
it would demand for the export market under prot-centre level bargaining.
The adverse impact of this higher wage on the rms competitiveness, in turn,
implies that the minimum productivity required to export is higher under the
rm-level regime than under the prot-centre one (i.e. the export cut-o¤ level
falls as wage setting shifts from the prot-centre to the rm level).
In a sense, unionspreparedness to accept decentralisation of wage bargain-
ing at the sub-rm level can be interpreted as reecting their willingness to
moderate rent extraction in activities exposed to more intense product market
competition in favour of rent creation, by protecting employment in those ac-
tivities.26 Our model suggests, however, that by enabling a closer link between
wages and the di¤erential competitive pressure and protability a rm faces in
its di¤erent markets, prot-centre level bargaining may ultimately allow unions
to extract a higher total rent than that obtained with rm-level negotiations.
This is evidently the case with monopoly unions, as shown in Figure A.2 in the
Appendix that plots the total labour rents in the two regimes over the distrib-
ution of c.27
25As they point out, Naylor [30] also showed that unions in a right-to-manage model may
be prepared to trade-o¤ a wage reduction for employment gains from a foreign market.
26 In a model in which unions can choose the amount of resources dedicated to rent extraction
and rent creation, Aidt and Sena [1] demonstrate that they devote more resources to the latter
in rms that are exposed to more intense market competition.
27Given their objective function, unions in this model would prefer prot-centre level ne-
gotiations. Clearly, were wage inequality to enter their objective function, the two regimes
would present unions with a trade-o¤ between wage dispersion and total labour rent.
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In light of the tendency towards higher degrees of decentralisation of wage
bargaining, down to the level of plants, our analysis also suggests that trade
liberalisation can a¤ect wage inequality even among homogenous workers within
an industry along two dimensions: across rms (via its e¤ects on competitive
selection) and within rms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).
Proposition 7 A trade liberalisation that eases access to foreign markets re-
duces intra-rm and increases industry-wide wage dispersion.
As far as intra-rm wage dispersion is concerned, a bilateral and symmetric
trade liberalisation or a process of unilateral liberalisation by the foreign country
(i.e. an increase in , that makes it easier to export for home country rms), by
reducing the discrepancy between a rms price elasticity of demand in the two
markets will shrink the di¤erence between domesticand exportwages and
lead to a fall in the domestic cut-o¤ cD and an increase in the export cut-o¤
cX .28 Therefore, whilst  for a given degree of trade openness prot centre
level negotiations result in within-rm wage inequality, increasing economic in-
tegration by narrowing the gap in the competitive pressure felt by rms in
their di¤erent markets  reduce the incentives for wage discrimination within
the rm. However, intra-industry wage dispersion (measured by the variance of
wages within the industry) increases in response to a trade liberalisation that
reduces the cost of foreign market penetration. To see this, we rst determine
the average industry wage, given by:
w =

1 +
v
2 (  1)
8><>:1 +
24 L
L

+2

h
(2  v)2   (2  v)2 
i
h
(2  v)2   (2  v)2 
i
35

+2
9>=>; (56)
which, with symmetric countries, becomes:
w =

1 +
v
2 (  1)

(1 + ) (57)
As is clear from (56) a bilateral and a unilateral increase in  always increases
w. Making use of (57), the variance of wages in the monopolistic sector in the
case of symmetric countries can be derived as:
2w = (+ 1)
h
v2+ 2 (  2) (v + 2  2)2
i
4 (  1)2 (  2)
28 Instead, a process of unilateral liberalisation by the home country (i.e. an increase in ,
that makes it easier for foreign rms to access the home countrys market) will have opposite
e¤ects on both cut-o¤s and wages. The e¤ects of both bilateral and unilateral liberalisation
on the cut-o¤s are the same qualitatively as in Melitz and Ottaviano [27]. Clearly, however,
trade liberalisation has a di¤erent impact on wages and on the distribution of income in our
model due to the presence of unions. These e¤ects of trade liberalisation on wages are also
consistent with those obtained (both theoretically and empirically), by Amiti and Davis [2].
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which is clearly increasing in . This result reects the process of competitive
selection within the industry triggered by trade liberalisation. On the one hand,
the fall in cD which implies the exit of the least e¢ cient rms in the industry
that pay the lowest wages, will work towards a reduction of wage dispersion. On
the other hand, the redistribution of market shares towards the more e¢ cient
rms will increase wage inequality.29
Before concluding, we briey turn to consider the e¤ects of unionisation
on welfare in the open economy. As in autarky, due to the absence of long-run
prots, welfare in the economy corresponds to the indirect utility function, given
by equation (29). For v = v, inspection of (32) reveals that B falls in v via the
same type of e¤ects described for the closed economy. As in the autarkic case,
average welfare in the economy is then given by:
W 
P
W
L
=
(V C   l)ND
L
+ 1 + q0 +B,
where the rst term in brackets on the right-hand-side is average income and
where V C and l are now given respectively by:
V C =
(2  v) (+ v)
4 (+ 1) (+ 2) (cD)

h
L (cD)
+2
+ L (cD)
+2
i
and:
l =
(2  v)
4 (+ 1) (+ 2)
1
(cD)

h
(cD)
+2
L+ (cD)
+2
L
i
.
When the two countries are symmetric, these become respectively:
V C =
(2  v) (+ v)L
4 (+ 1) (+ 2)
(1 + ) (cD)
2 ,
and
l =
(2  v)L (1 + )
4 (+ 1) (+ 2)
(cD)
2 ,
which in turn imply that average income30 is the same as in autarky:
I =
v

cD
+ 2
(  cD) + 1.
Analysis of these expressions reveal that the opening up of trade between two
symmetric countries does not qualitatively alter the e¤ects of changes in union
power on welfare. Clearly, since the domestic cut-o¤ cD in the open economy
is smaller than in autarky, the threshold level of  at which positive welfare
29This result is in line with that obtained by Egger and Kreickemeier [14], who measure
wage dispersion as the ratio of the average to the lowest wage in the industry (i.e. the wage
of the marginal rms). Since, in our case wD = wX = 1, this measure in our paper would
correspond to the average wage w which, as discussed above  is also increasing in .
30Clearly, in a two sector economy, income is not solely determined by wages in the monop-
olistic sector since households also work in the lower wage homogenous good sector. Thus,
average income depends also on the distribution of employment across the two sectors.
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e¤ects of an increase in v occur is also lower than in autarky. The e¤ects of
trade liberalisation on welfare are also dependent on the size of : @ W@ R 0
if, and only if,  R 2cD[2(+1) 3v](4 3v+6) . Thus, when the preference for variety is
su¢ ciently strong, trade liberalisation increases welfare despite the fact that in
this instance it may reduce average income (since I falls in  if  > 2cD).
4 Conclusions
We have examined the e¤ects of the interplay between labour market union-
isation and international trade on competitive selection among heterogenous
rms. Though some of our ndings echo those of other recent work in this area,
this paper adds to the existing literature in important respects and generates
interesting empirically testable predictions.
The endogenous determination of wages via bargaining between heteroge-
neous rms and rm specic unions in the presence of rm specic markups
implies that equilibrium wages di¤er between rms and thus between ex-ante
identical workers. This result hinges on the role of unionisation as a rent-
sharing mechanism between workers and rms. Additionally, decentralisation
of bargaining at the prot-centre level results in two rm-specic wages related
to production for the domestic and export markets, respectively. We show that
whilst both wages are always higher in high productivity rms than in low pro-
ductivity ones, within a rm, the export wage is lower than the domestic wage.
This is because sub-rm level agreements result in a stronger link between wage
demands and the di¤erent degrees of market power that rms have in their
domestic and export markets with unions being prepared to moderate rent
extraction in those activities that are exposed to more intense product market
competition. By protecting employment in the export prot centre of the rm,
we show that this behaviour can in turn result in a higher total labour rent
being extracted than under rm level negotiations.
These ndings suggest that the nature of bargaining is an important channel
through which trade liberalisation a¤ects wage inequality. To the extent that
operating in di¤erent markets exposes a rm to di¤erent competitive pressures,
the observed tendency to adopt prot-centre level agreements can result in an
additional source of wage dispersion. A testable prediction of the model is thus
that, for a given level of openness, decentralisation of bargaining at the sub-
rm level ought to result in exporting rms exhibiting higher intra-rm wage
dispersion. Clearly, empirical research is required to investigate the extent to
which changes in wage dispersion as a result of trade liberalisation occur across
(as an eminently competitive selection e¤ect) or within (as a wage discrimination
e¤ect) rms.
We identify three main channels through which an increase in the bargaining
power of unions a¤ects the nature of the industry equilibrium, namely: (i)
a variety e¤ect, (ii) a counter competitive e¤ect, and (iii) a selection e¤ect.
These stem from the fact that, for a given bargaining power, a unions rent
extraction ability is higher the higher is the productivity of the rm with which it
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negotiates. As a result, a given increase in union power will translate in relatively
larger wage demand increases in relatively more e¢ cient rms i.e. it will raise
the cost of labour in more e¢ cient rms proportionally more than in less e¢ cient
ones. In a two country setting in which, as is standard in this literature, only
the more e¢ cient rms become exporters an increase in unionsbargaining
power pushes up the minimum productivity required to export. Thus, a higher
bargaining power of unions in one country can be thought of as (i) softening
the competition facing domestic rms (with more rms of a lower e¢ ciency
entering the domestic market) and (ii) toughening the competition in the export
sector (by increasing the level of e¢ ciency required to become exporters). More
generally, rms exporting to a country with stronger unions will face a softer
competition from domestic rms in that market; instead, domestic rms in a
market will face a tougher competition from exporters located in a country
with more powerful unions. Thus, a key testable prediction of the model is that
industries in countries where unions are stronger should be expected to have
a lower average productivity resulting in higher average markups and prices
and in lower average quantities and prots but also o¤er an easier access to
foreign exporters.
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Appendix Wage and cut-o¤s for the case of
rm-level bargaining
When wages are set with rm-level negotiations, each exporting rm will
have one wage. In the case of monopoly unions (i.e. with v = 1), the rm-level
wage rule of a rm producing for both domestic and export markets (i.e. with
0 < c < cX) is given by equation (40). When countries are symmetric this
becomes:
wU (c) =
1
3
+
2
3c
pD(c) + pX(c)
1 + 2
(58)
For the marginal rms producing only for the domestic market, the wage is given
by equation (37). It is immediate to see that at c = cD, wD(cD) = 1. These rms
also have zero operating prots, which implies: pD(cD) = wU (cD)cD = cD.
Let us consider rms that operate on both markets, i.e. with 0 < c < cX .
From the inverse demand functions for marginal and infra-marginal rms and
the prot maximising output, qD(c) = L [pD(c)  wU (c)c], we obtain:
cD   pD(c) = pD(c)  wU (c)c. (59)
Their prot maximising export price will be:
pX(c) =
wU (c)
2
c+
P + 
2 ( +N)
. (60)
Equations (58), (59), (60) give a system of three equations that can be solved
to determine pD(c), pX(c), and wU (c), respectively given by:
pD(c) =
 (P + )
4 ( +N) (2 + 1)
+
cD
 
22 + 3

4 (2 + 1)
+
c
4
(61)
pX(c) =
 
32 + 2

(P + )
4 ( +N) (2 + 1)
+
cD
4 (2 + 1)
+
1
4
c
wU (c) =
 (P + )
2c ( +N) (2 + 1)
+
cD
2c (2 + 1)
+
1
2
Noting that (42) implies that when countries are symmetric
cX =
cD
wU (cX)
(62)
we can rewrite wU (cX) in (61) as follows:
wU (cX) =
( +N)
 
2 + 1

cD
( +N) (22    + 2) cD   2 (P + ) (63)
Following the same procedure used to obtain (59), we know that pX(cX) =
wU (cX)cX =
cDwU (cX)
wU (cX)
= cD, from which the export price of the marginal
exporters (whose export quantity is zero) is:
pX(cX) = cD (64)
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Noting that pX(cX)   pX(c) = pX(c)   wU (c)c and making use of (64) we
then obtain pX(c) = c4 +
(+22+2)cD
4(2+1) +
2(P+)
4(+N)(2+1) . Equating this to the
expression for pX(c) in (61), we can solve for z  P++N to obtain:
z = cD (65)
Making use of (65), the wages in (61) and (63) can now be rewritten as:
wU (c) =
1
2

cD
c
 + 1
2 + 1
+ 1

(66)
wU (cX) =
2 + 1
2    + 2
Thus, as in the prot-level bargaining case, more productive rms pay higher
wages. It is also clear from (66) that wU (cX) > 1 for  > 1 and wU (cX) = 1 for
 = 1.
Given that with rm-level bargaining, rms producing for the domestic mar-
ket will have di¤erent wage rules depending on whether they are also exporters
or not, the zero-expected-prot free-entry condition is written as follows:Z cX
0
xD(c)
c 1
cM
dc+
Z cD
cX
dD(c)
c 1
cM
dc+
Z cX
0
xX(c)
c 1
cM
dc = fE
where the superscripts d and x refer to the domestic-only or exporting status
of the rm. In particular, given the expression for wU (c) in (66), and noting
that wU (cX) in (66) implies that from (62): cD = cX 
2+1
2 +2 , the prots from
domestic sales and from exports of rms with c < cX will be respectively:
xD(c) =
1
16
L
h
cX

22 +1
2 +2

  c
i2

,
xX(c) =
1
16
L

3 (cX   c)2 .
Prots of rms that only produce for the domestic market, with cX < c < cD,
will instead be:
D(c) =
1
16
L

(cD   c)2 .
The expected zero-prot free-entry condition can then be solved to derive cD:
cD =

 
2 + 1

2    + 2

16fEc

M
LD
 1
+2
whereD =
2
h
2

+3
 +2+2

(2+1)
2
+(32+4)( 1)22+( 1)(10 72+93 8)+2( +2+3+4+2)
i
( +2+2)2(+2)(+1) ,
from which cX can be obtained from cD = cX 
2+1
2 +2 . Figure A.1 below plots
the cut-o¤ in the two bargaining regimes against  .
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The total labour rent a union can extract from an exporting rm in the two
bargaining regimes can be obtained by substituting the expressions for the equi-
librium wages and a rms employment levels into: VU (c) = (wU (c)  1) (lD(c) + lX(c))
and VS(c) = (wD(c)  1) lD(c) + (wX(c)  1) lX(c), which give a unions total
labour rent for the rm-level and prot centre level case, respectively. These
are plotted in Figure A.2 below.
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Figure A.1. Cut-o¤s for rm-level and prot centre-level bargaining
Prot-centre level bargaining (solid lines): cD (thin), cX (thick)
Firm-level bargaining (dashed lines): cD (thin) and cX (thick)
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400
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total labour rent
Figure A.2. Total labour rent
Prot-centre level bargaining (solid line), rm-level (dashed line)
v = 1,  = 2,  = 0:2,  = 6, cM= 10, L = 100, fE= 1,  = 1:118
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Figure 1. Optimal wage rules: wD(c) (thin line), wX(c) (thick line), wU (c) (dotted line)
v = 0:5,  = 1:118
Cut-o¤ levels: cD= 1:487 and cX= 1:33
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Figure 2. Prot-centre level wages: wD(c) (continuous line) and wX(c) (dashed line)
v = 0:5,  = 2,  = 0:2,  = 6, cM= 10, L = 100, fE= 1,  = 1:118
Cut-o¤ levels at these values: cD= 1:4756 and cX= 1:3199
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Figure 3. Wages
Prot-centre level bargaining (solid lines): wD(c) (thin), wX(c) (thick)
Firm level bargaining (dashed lines): wU;D(c) (thin) wU (c) (thick);
Cut-o¤ levels for prot-centre bargaining: cD= 1:8072 and cX= 1:616 5
Cut-o¤ levels for the rm-level bargaining: cD=1:7701 and cX=1:5002
v = 1,  = 2,  = 0:2,  = 6, cM= 10, L = 100, fE= 1,  = 1:118
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